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Russian president Vladimir Putin dropped a bombshell on Wednesday during his 2020 state of the unx address to legislators. He announced a raft of constitutional amendments that, if enacted, would transform the Russian political system. In response, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev offered the resignation of the country’s entire Cabinet so that Putin could form a new government to oversee the changes. Putin did not invite the outgoing premier to head the new government. Instead, he nominated the head of Russia’s tax service, Mikhail Mishustin, to be the next prime minister.

周三,俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔 · 普京在2020年国情咨文中向立法者发表讲话时,抛出了一枚重磅炸弹。 他宣布了一系列宪法修正案,如果获得通过,将改变俄罗斯的政治体制。
作为回应,俄罗斯总理德米特里 · 梅德韦杰夫提出该国整个内阁的辞职,以便普京能够组建一个新政府来监督这些变化,普京没有邀请这位即将离任的总理领导新政府,相反,他提名俄罗斯税务局局长米哈伊尔 · 米舒斯金为下一任总理。

Putin had apparently given no warning to Russia’s political elite that he would make these proposals, and the aftershocks of his announcements—and Medvedev’s resignation—are only beginning to be felt. One thing is clear: after months of speculation about who would drive the succession question—when Putin is constitutionally mandated to step down from the presidency in 2024—Putin has regained the initiative. Moreover, given that these reforms are expected to be put to a popular vote, he now has a Napoleonic-style referendum with which to mobilize the population and seek the public imprimatur of a new mandate for reshaping Russian politics for the 2020s.

普京显然没有警告俄罗斯的政治精英们他会提出这些建议,而他的声明 ( 以及梅德韦杰夫的辞职 ) 所带来的余波才刚刚开始显现。
有一件事是明确的:数月来,人们一直在猜测谁将推动继任问题的解决——根据宪法规定,普京将于2024年从总统职位上退下来——在此之后,普京重新获得了主动权。
此外,鉴于这些改革预计将付诸全民投票,他现在有了一场拿破仑式的全民公投,借此动员民众,并寻求公众批准一项新的授权,以便在本世纪20年代重塑俄罗斯政治。



It is also unclear how long Mishustin—a technocrat with no independent power base in the Russian establishment—will remain as prime minister. Given Putin’s emphasis in his address on improving economic conditions, Mishustin, who has overseen the modernization of tax collection in Russia and increases in revenue to the state treasury, is likely to be asked to focus on getting the Russian economy through the hump of the next two years and to lay the foundations for Putin’s Arctic development plans by ensuring sufficient capital is on hand to sustain those investments. Reassuring foreign investors that some of the arbitrariness of the past several years is going to be replaced by predictability may also be part of his mandate—especially the Asian and Middle Eastern investors that have been courted by the Kremlin.

同样不清楚的是,米舒斯金这位在俄罗斯权势集团中没有独立权力基础的技术官僚会担任多久总理。
鉴于普京在讲话中强调改善经济状况,米舒斯金可能会被要求专注于帮助俄罗斯经济渡过未来两年的困难时期,并通过确保有足够的资金来维持这些投资,为普京的北极开发计划奠定基础。
向外国投资者保证,过去几年的一些专横行为将被可预测性行为所取代,可能也是他职责的一部分,尤其是克里姆林宫一直在讨好的亚洲和中东投资者。

Other leading figures may or may not retain their portfolios. One could envision Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov transitioning to becoming Russia’s point man on the Middle East, in order to allow a new face to interact with the West. In contrast, energy minister Alexander Novak may need to be retained in order to shepherd the Russia-Saudi Arabia relationship that sustains OPEC Plus arrangements for global oil markets. But what we are likely to see is the beginning of a four-year-long version of “Russia’s Got (Government) Talent” as a new generation of managers, ministers and diplomats are tested out.

其他主要人物可能会、也可能不会保留,人们可以想象,俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖 · 拉夫罗夫将成为俄罗斯在中东问题上的核心人物,以便让一个新面孔与西方国家互动。
能源部长亚历山大诺瓦克可能继续留任,以保持俄罗斯与沙特阿拉伯的关系,这种关系维系着欧佩克 +( OPEC Plus)及全球石油市场的安排。
但我们可能看到的是,随着新一代管理人员、部长和外交官接受考验,为期4年的“ 俄罗斯 ( 政府) 人才”计划即将开始。

This all feeds into the great succession question of 2024—and what role Putin plans to play. Given the constitutional amendments, he appears to be laying out a series of different options. If we take Putin at his word, that he does not plan to be president again, then that would explain why the powers of the presidency would be weakened after 2024. The role of the Duma to sext the government would be enhanced and the prime minister would have increased power and authority—but would also become formally responsible to the parliamentary majority and subject to recall and replacement. Finally, the State Council would acquire new and formal status and control over parts of Russian foreign and domestic policy.

这一切都将引出2024年的继承人问题——以及普京打算扮演什么角色。
考虑到宪法修正案,他似乎提出了一系列不同的选择,如果我们相信普京的话,即他不打算再次成为总统,那么这就可以解释为什么2024年后总统的权力会被削弱。
国家杜马选择政府的作用将得到加强,总理将拥有更大的权力和权威,但也将对议会多数派承担起正式责任,并须进行罢免和更换,最后,国务院将获得新的正式地位,并控制俄罗斯的部分外交和国内政策。

So, I see Putin keeping his options open. He could return to the premiership or he could remove himself from the day-to-day challenges of governing but retain an all-important veto power by becoming head of the parliament and/or chairman of the state council. But what all of these changes would allow is a leadership transition but one on Putin’s agenda and with him surrendering key levers of power on his own timetable. In this, Putin appears to be emulating steps taken both by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore and Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan .

因此,我认为普京仍保留了选择的余地,他可以重新担任总理,或者脱离日常的治理挑战,但通过担任议会议长和 ( 或) 国务院主席,保留至关重要的否决权。
但所有这些变化都会带来领导权的交接,但这只是普京政治议程上的一个变化,而普京将按照自己的时间表交出关键的权力杠杆。
在这方面,普京似乎是在效仿新加坡的李光耀和哈萨克斯坦纳扎尔巴耶夫的做法。

This represents a major challenge to U.S. policy, which seems to be predicated on waiting for the “day after” Putin before any sort of normalization of U.S.-Russia relations can take place. It means that Putin may not fully depart from the Russian scene for years after 2024. At the same time, if the power that is concentrated right now in the Russian presidency is partially redistributed to several figures, it could create the basis for a “collective Putin” to assume different pieces of the power puzzle under the supervision and guidance of “elder Putin”—ensuring that his vision and approach will continue into the mid-twenty-first century.

这是对美国政策的一个重大挑战,美国的政策似乎是建立在等待“普京下台后”美俄关系正常化的基础上的。
这意味着2024年之后,普京可能不会完全脱离俄罗斯政治舞台,与此同时,如果目前集中在俄罗斯总统身上的权力部分重新分配给几个人物,这可能为“集体普京”在“老普京”的监督和指导下承担不同的权力拼图奠定基础,确保他的愿景和治理方式将持续到21世纪中叶。